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Externalities of Hedge Fund activism on the suppliers of the targeted firms. How does
Activism affect all parties involved?
Abstract
The world of hedge fund activism has been heavily reviewed by academics and
journalists. However, academics have truly only looked at the most immediate consequences of
activism by primarily researching the changes in the company targeted. Although important, this
neglects the spillover impacts of activism. How can individuals definitively say shareholder
activists are good or bad without looking at all of the effects of their presence? To help answer
this question, the focus of this paper surrounds the externalities of hedge fund activism on the
suppliers of target companies. The results particularly emphasize certain financial metrics,
calculating their change over time as a result of the presence of an activist. Ultimately, the results
show that the presence of an activist has a significantly negative effect on supplier firms,
harming operating income margin and D&A while increasing restructuring costs.
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1. Introduction
Criticism of shareholder activists by the masses stems from the thought that hedge funds
are driven entirely by greed. “Pundits” claim that these investors are myopic in focus, putting
stress on target companies without contemplating the long term consequences. As a result of
these claims, academics have scoured data in the hopes of substantiating these complaints. In
fact, the evidence points towards more positives than negatives when it comes to activism.
Papers have proven that target companies see positive returns in the capital markets, in addition
to improvements in operations and research / development capabilities. Researchers also see a
general benefit in the product market of these targets, indicating that competitors see a benefit
without properly receiving activist attention. Although most literature points to the positive
benefits of activism, this remains a relatively burgeoning field. As activists become more
prevalent in the marketplace, academics become more interested in studying their effects.
Consequently, this paper hopes to contribute to this field, focusing on the spillover effects of
these campaigns. Mimicking previous studies in this field, the analysis in this paper observed the
change in financial metrics for supplier firms in the one, two, and three years before and after
activism. In addition to these time frames, the research also noted financial changes based on the
specific level of activist engagement, including the first instance of interaction, passing of the
five percent ownership threshold, and submission of the 13-D. By utilizing binary variables and
holding certain variables constant, the conducted research focused on the specific impact that
activism had on these firms. This paper finds that suppliers are negatively affected by these
funds, notably in the operating income margin.
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2. Background
Shareholder activists have been attempting to create value in corporations since the early
20th century. Officially, according to the SEC, the catalyst for the present version of activism
came in 1942 with the introduction of regulation 14a-8, which legally required companies to
allow shareholders to provide proxy materials for annual meetings. Since then, the landscape for
activism has changed drastically. Stuart and Starks write that the 1940’s through 1970’s saw the
preponderance of interventions started by individual activists; the contemporary version of
activism, where institutional investors challenge management, gained legs in the 1980s, starting
with the formation of the Council of Institutional Investors, a lobbying group for shareholder
rights. Since then, many companies have had the opportunity to appreciate the actions of activist
intervention, and in particular, “target firms tend to decrease their capital expenditures, increase
their payouts, and increase their incidence of asset divestitures, restructurings, or employee
layoffs” (Denes et al., 2017). Research has thoroughly shown the positive effects that activists
deliver to target companies and their competitors in the short and long term.

3. Literature Review
While media and management often struggle with perceptions of hedge fund activism,
research has shown that activists investing in both equity and debt create substantial value for
investors. However, this claim does not come without debate. The SEC posits that the presence
of activism encourages accountability among executives, while the Business Roundtable, a
collection of US company managers, denounces activists as myopic (Goranova and Ryan, 2014).
Specifically, around the time of the filing of a 13-D, which indicates a hedge fund’s mission to
turn from the passive to activist category, investors realize “10.2% average abnormal stock
returns” and 11.4% over the course of the following year (Klein and Zur, 2009). This indicates
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that, in the short run, activism does more than anger the board and provoke arguments through
the news. Most literature agrees that activism events promote short-term abnormal returns in the
equity market. In addition, other academics have looked at the long term effects of hedge fund
activism in order to challenge a pervasive idea that plagues the activist space: the activist asks for
changes in the short term that negatively affect the company in the long term. Additionally, a
paper titled “Recent Advantages in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value Creation and
Identification” has shown that the initial abnormal returns created by the activists are not
reversed even five years after the initial play (Brav et al., 2015).
However, some critics complain that these results aren’t generated by activists, rather the
alpha is just captured at the right time, and activists do not inherently create value. In particular,
hedge fund activists legitimately improve the underlying operations of target firms. In their paper
observing the effects of activism on productivity and asset allocation, Brav, Jiang, and Kim
claim that takeover candidates generally see appreciation of “production efficiency” in the three
years post 13-D (2015). They prove that activism events increase the output of long term assets,
“facilitate the efficient reallocation of corporate assets”, and improve labor productivity. Their
evidence specifically points to the fact that hedge fund activists are markedly different from their
passive counterparts – activism requires a certain amount of skill in addition to finding
underperforming assets in comparison to the market. In fact, even with regular hedge funds, the
ability to regularly generate alpha for limited partners has been proven to require skill.
Consequently, “performance persistence” among funds, where top performers over a three year
period generally achieve a similar performance over the three following years, contribute to a
system where the best funds receive the most investor capital (Ravi et al., 2010). In the same
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sense, successful activist funds are more than just good at “stock-picking,” they have to
demonstrate an ability to positively manipulate operations in order to continue to survive.
Interestingly, given the typically limited holdings by these activists, one might wonder how
they are so effective in causing change. Some postulate that shareholder activists often work
together in order to generate the most change in a corporation. Forester Wong, a professor of
accounting at USC Marshall, explains that “those who accumulate shares before a 13-D filing are
more likely to be investors who have a relationship with the lead activist, which is consistent
with coordination by a pack leader” and that the presence of this consortium is positively
correlated with the future outcome of the major activist’s requests (2016). In other words,
shareholder activists require the support of other funds in order to increase the likelihood of
success in affecting the corporate governance of its target firms, thereby permitting the
manipulation of operations. Regardless, activists are still effective in their contributions to the
board, as firms see significant increases in operating metrics.
Contributing more to the argument that activism actually creates value, certain decisions
made for target companies have positive, long term effects outside of what this paper previously
mentioned. While activists are widely criticized for promoting cost cutting and other measures in
the short term without regards for the long term impact, these actions can turn out to be
extremely productive. For instance, Brav et al., in a paper observing corporate innovation write
that “research and development spending drops significantly in absolute amount during the fiveyear window subsequent to hedge fund activism. . . [but] patent quality and quantity actually
improve” (2018). This leads one to believe that R&D prior to intervention was not as efficient as
it could be, and suggests further that activists are value added managers.
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For the broader market, these investors indirectly benefit competitors of whatever
company received investment. In other words, hedge fund activism creates value for the overall
market. Aslan and Kumar prove that “rivals respond to activism not only by reducing prices but
also by improving their own productivity, cost and capital allocation efficiency, and product
differentiation” (2016). While the magnitude of the benefit “given” to competitors is not the
same, the overall market clearly becomes more competitive, which benefits consumers.
In addition to investing in equity, activists are able to diversify investing strategies in
order to generate the most alpha. When it comes to taking advantage of a bankruptcy situation,
hedge funds often are “investing in debt claims, buying equity stakes, serving on the creditors or
equity committee, and pursuing a ‘loan-to-own’ strategy” (Wei et al., 2012). While this strategy,
called junior activism, does not require the 13-D, it is an effective way for activists to generate
alpha. In fact, “when junior activists intend to influence the outcome of a restructuring, they
publicly file pleadings with the court at key moments in the case to obtain bargaining leverage”
(Ellias, 2016). So while activists do not file the same documents, there is still a method required
to go through this process. Furthermore, Ellias shows that the presence of an activist increases
the appraisal value of a firm, which contributes to the idea that hedge fund activism creates
value. While junior activism focuses on the outcome of a Chapter 11 proceeding, hedge fund
activists are also seen to benefit debt holders in general. According to Sunder et al., debt
investors “benefit alongside shareholders” when shareholder activists “adopt strategies involving
curbing managerial entrenchment or improving governance” (2014). This shows that these
activists, while not always boosting the returns of bondholders, can cause a significant gain in
returns both in the equity and debt in a company. The implications of this finding are obvious:
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the presence of shareholder activists can benefit every investor, regardless of his or her position
in the capital structure.
While funds seem to clearly benefit the financial metrics and overall efficiency of targets,
activists play an integral role in the exits of their investments. In fact, some scholars contend that
shareholder activists only contribute value when the target company goes through an acquisition.
Michael Schor and Robin Greenwood explain that “activists are most successful at creating value
when they are able to effect a change in control” (2009). In addition, they illustrate that the
significant market returns earned by activists are directly related to these acquisitions. Moreover,
Boyson et al., write, “We find that failed takeover bids for activism targets display significant
long-term abnormal returns along with improvements in operating performance and changes in
financial policy compared with activism that is not accompanied by takeover threats” (2017).
This supports the claim that the presence, or threat, of M&A is the real cause of value to these
funds. This does not necessarily disagree with literature previously cited in this paper, but it
points to a specific reason for why investors exhibit abnormal returns. Explicitly, these papers
attribute the success of activists to the increased probability of M&A. However, one also might
conclude that the aforementioned performance improvements make these targets more attractive
acquisition candidates, which attracts the attention of a strategic buyout. Regardless, promoting
M&A seems to be a viable method for generating returns to shareholders.
Despite the previous revelations, it is important to note that activists themselves bear a
burden in instituting change, irrespective of the outcome of their campaign. Obviously,
badgering management and releasing news reports costs money. A study by Nickolay Gantchev,
a professor at SMU and a University of Pennsylvania Ph.D recipient, found that the ultimate cost
of an activist campaign culminating in a proxy contest amounts to ~$10.71 million. He goes on
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to explain that this cost has a significant impact on negotiation tactics used by these funds
(2012). Given this large expense, it makes sense that firms have to choose wisely when investing
in targets. Furthermore, this contributes to the idea that firms prefer to work with management.
Ultimately, this goes to show that firms must be critical in analyzing target companies, as the
effort is far from inexpensive.
Ultimately, the research shows that hedge fund activists are extremely valuable for
investors and the economy. Manipulating management by investing in equity or debt allows for
considerable appreciation of a firm’s operations, which ultimately increases value. While some
argue against the actions of activists by citing short-termism, it is nearly impossible to argue
against the positive impact markets are actually seeing. More specifically, activists create value
for firms by increasing efficiency while still cutting costs. Moreover, the cost cutting streamlines
the organization’s effectiveness, and there is not a long term negative impact as a result of
spending less. This indicates that activists are actually good managers, and they are genuinely
trying to create better businesses.
These previous discoveries have been surface level – a thorough look at the externalities
must be completed in order to fully understand how activism affects the economy. While returns
and improvements in target companies are good, if activists negatively affect suppliers, then
academics and regulators may need to start observing interventions with a different light. As a
result, observing the implications of activism on third parties appears to be the next logical step
in this general research arena. This rest of this paper seeks to find the impact on these
aforementioned third parties.
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4. Data
4.1 Data Description
To help test this hypothesis, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang, prominent scholars who have been
cited throughout this paper, graciously shared hedge fund activist data from 1994 – 2014. This
paragraph is to thank them for their generosity.
The methods for conducting this research drew upon previous studies in this field,
primarily utilizing the data provided by Brav and Jiang. Generally, it is difficult and time
consuming to assess the actual beginning of an activist campaign, but the government has an
established criteria for classifying activism. Given the requirement to submit a 13-D filing,
searching EDGAR provides a way to find instances of activism. Luckily, the provided dataset
already searched this database. Furthermore, Brav et al., in the article on corporate innovation,
discussed “using news searches for activists who own between two percent and five percent of
shares at mid to large cap companies” in order to get an even more detailed data set (2018). This
added more data points for this study. Additionally, the contributed dataset provides the
following information: fund name, target name, CUSIP, date of the 13-D, date of the five percent
threshold, and date of the first interaction. In all, there are roughly 4,000 instances of activism
that Brav and Jiang have observed.
This data was then inputted into Wharton Research Data Services website in order to
draw from Factset and Compustat. Factset’s Revere database provided information on the
suppliers of the targeted firms. This was extremely convenient, as Revere noted all suppliers of
the target firms within the data set’s time frame. The next step utilized the acquired CUSIPS and
tickers to gather quarterly information on all of the target firms from both of the previously
mentioned databases. In particular, Compustat was able to provide the SIC codes that Brav et al.
use for industry fixed effects. Specifically, Factset and Compustat gave financial information
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necessary to run the regressions, including: market value, total assets, total liabilities, return on
assets, operating income, total revenue, cost of goods sold, SG&A, and D&A. In addition to this
information, company age was used as a control during the regression. Gathering this
information required manually scrubbing google and company website pages. Age zero was
defined as the year the company was founded, and this increased by a fourth for each additional
quarter.

4.2 Data Cleaning
While Brav and Jiang provided thorough data in the initial activism set, inputting these
CUSIPS into Factset Revere came with challenges. Many of the resulting supplier relationships
lacked sufficient data to proceed with extracting their respective financial information from
Compustat or Factset. In some instances, these suppliers did not have usable CUSIP or tickers, or
they lacked the necessary “begin” and “end” date of their relationship with the target. In these
instances, the firms could not provide us the requisite data to include them in the regressions.
After accounting for these issues and removing the afflicted suppliers, the dataset then noted the
targets that were present at the time of activism, and it also included the firms that were not
engaged with the target during this time. This allowed the research to be more accurate, as the
regression was then able to account for the change in financial metrics for targets specifically
with respect to the presence of the activist by using a binary activism variable.

4.3 Methodology
Having procured the necessary financial information and controls, the following
regression was run:
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𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐,,.
= 𝛼, + 𝛼234 + 𝜏. + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚,,. + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,,. + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,.
+ 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,. + 𝜃Χ,,. + 𝜖,,.
The nature of this analysis relied heavily on the methodology used by Brav et al. in their papers
on corporate innovation and asset productivity. First, the financial metrics in question were the
ones mentioned earlier in the Data Description section. This study initially looked at ROA,
Tobin’s Q, defined as market value over book value of assets and liabilities, and operating
income margin. Using the regression formula above, we solved for the aforementioned financial
metrics, whereby the subscript c,t represents each supplier company and time period,
respectively. As for time, we specifically looked at the quarters changing from t - three to t +
three years, with t = zero acting as the event where the fund first initiated contact, acquired five
percent of the company, or submitted a 13-D. Next, the formula controlled for many things in
order to remain certain that the regression specifically looked at the impact of hedge fund
activism. In particular, this research utilized the controls included in the papers mentioned above,
and this is represented by 𝜃Χ,,. . Specifically, firm size and company age were controlled by
taking the logarithm of market value and adding the firm’s age since founding, respectively.
Moreover, we added firm fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and time fixed effects. Industry
fixed effects utilized the SIC codes downloaded from Compustat, and this was accounted for by
the 𝛼234 in the regression formula. For firm fixed effects, the ticker of each individual company
was noted. This input is reflected by 𝛼, , and it reflects aspects of each company that are different
from the others. Finally, time fixed effects had to be adjusted for the differences in financial
period end dates. To do so, quarter end dates received a count, with the earliest possible quarter
receiving a one and subsequent quarters adding a one to the previous. As some firms ended their
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first quarter in the year during January, February, or March, these were rolled up into the same
period for fixed effects purposes. As an example, March 31, February 28, and January 31 end
dates would all receive the same count, depending on the year. Furthermore, time fixed effects
demonstrate changes in the environment that occur over time, such as tax or law changes, and 𝜏.
represented this control. As briefly mentioned previously, together, these elements are added to
isolate the effects of the presence of an activist, ensuring that commonalities are left out of the
analysis. Most importantly, 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚,,. shows how the financial ratios are actually affected by
activists; this is a binary variable, whereby 𝛽 = one when the activist has made contact with the
target. We utilize this variable for the first instance of activism, time of crossing the five percent
threshold, and date of signage of 13-D. This allows the regression to show if there is a difference
in significance among the levels of “hostility” demonstrated by the activists. The variables in the
form of 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,,. , 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,. , and 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,. follow the same
binary method as the original activism variable. Instead of inserting a one after the instance of
activism, these year variables focus only on the time period around the event. To elaborate, time
one year looks at the change in the targeted financial metrics one year before and after activism time two and three years follow the same prescription.

5. Results
Initially, this paper focused targeted the regression on Tobin’s Q and ROA in order to
understand how the market values the supplier’s assets post activism and how resilient the
suppliers are to potential relationship disruption. The tables below show the results for these two
variables.
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Interestingly, ROA seemed to have a significant change as result of activism at the point
of initial contact with the target firm. However, these results were not seen in the subsequent
years, nor did they apply to the 13-D or five percent threshold. Moreover, the Tobin’s Q value
had a significant change between the two years pre and post activism. What is more, the activist
had a more pronounced impact on these suppliers at the point of 13-D versus the initial point of
contact. While Tobin’s Q is a proxy for the market’s view on a company’s performance and
ROA demonstrates actual performance with respect to company resources, these results
demonstrate a minimal impact on the supplier firm. To explain further, the market does not
change its opinion on these firms, nor is profitability impacted with respect to the assets on the
balance sheet. However, these results make the regression on operating income more interesting.
It is important to note that the return on assets does not use exactly the same numerator as the
operating income margin, though both of these metrics provide valuable insight. Table three on
the following page shows the regression run on the operating income margin, and the results
imply even more significance than in the prior tables. Specifically, operating income is
negatively affected by activists at the two year mark, inclusive of the three different interaction
mediums mentioned throughout this paper. Contrasting these results with those of the ROA
regression, it appears as if profitability really does experience a negative shock as a result of
these activists. More saliently, while ROA illustrates a lack of an impact on the supplier firm,
activist intervention clearly hampers operating income margin to a p value of less than 0.01.
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The results of this regression analysis require a deeper glance into the underlying financial
metrics that are affected by the activist. Limited by the information available on both Factset and
Compustat, the only available data underlying this margin includes SG&A margin, Other
Operating Expense Margin, COGS Margin, and Depreciation and Amortization margin.
Observing the impact on these allowed for a deep dive into the actual cause of the significant
change in operating income margin. The results of these tables can be found in the appendix
below. Ultimately, other operating expense margin (Table 3a) and D&A margin (Table 3b) had
significant effects on operating income margin at the two year and three year marks,
respectively. The components of Depreciation and Amortization are rather straightforward to
understand, but those of other operating expenses are multifaceted and generally differ from firm
to firm. Unfortunately, and as seen above, Factset does not break out the components that make
up this line item. Labor and Related Expense, Equipment Expense, and interest expense were
used as proxies for other operating expenses in order to see if these might shed more light on the
afflicted operating income. Restructuring and reorganization expenses became interesting in the
event that the negative margin pushed suppliers towards insolvency. While the results pictured
insignificant changes in labor and interest expenses, equipment and restructuring expenses
changed significantly. These results can be seen in tables four and five below.
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At the three year mark, equipment expense experiences a significant increase in cost, and this
bump is more impactful in the two and three years post activism. Looking at restructuring and
reorganization expenses, there is a similar trend, with the cost being significant at the five
percent threshold.
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6. Discussion
Ultimately, the results were unexpected. This project initially had zero expectations for the
spillover effects into the supplier market. Due to the volatile nature of supplier contracts and the
turnover in relationship tenure, the potential for change in financial metrics encouraged analysis.
As mentioned before, the operating income margin had a significant negative change between
the two years pre and post activism. The underlying changes in expenses that affect this metric
imply that supplier firms become more efficient in operations as they anticipate the target firms’
reactions to activism. Moreover, the increase in equipment expense points towards a potential
administrative response. More saliently, other operating expenses and D&A lead to the biggest
impact on operating margin. In order to double check this response, these expenses were added
back to operating income. This isolated the effects of cost of goods sold and other undiscussed
expenses, allowing the regression to see if operating margin was still implicated. Table six below
illustrates these results. When adding back, the results do not elucidate a significant impact on
operating income, which corroborates the claim that other operating expenses and D&A are
significantly changed in the presence of an activist. Pointing back to the earlier paragraph on the
change in ROA with respect to operating margin, there is a potential reason for the insignificant
results on this metric. These suppliers are potentially scaling down their operations as the
activists move into the picture; given that both D&A and operating margin have negative
trajectories post activism, these trends might be similar in magnitude, which could explain the
limited change in ROA.
These changes lead to further questions about how suppliers react to these events.
Potentially, suppliers increase their capital expenditures as they struggle to become more
attractive to targets. As a result, they increase physical infrastructure, which increases the wear
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and tear costs of D&A. Digging deeper into the operating margin lead to the discovery of SG&A
changes, located in table seven. As is presented, SG&A costs significantly increase to a p value
of .01%. Given the pressures imposed onto targets by activists, this effect may be caused by a reexamination of administrative activities by the supplier. In other words, suppliers may evaluate
their relationships with targets and attempt to increase the manpower on each account, which
may cause an additional spend in SG&A. Finally, as seen in table five above, restructuring
charges increase as a result of activism. This result could be caused by target firms adopting new
supplier contracts and churning the old. In the event that the suppliers have only a few
customers, the loss of a target firm would have a severe impact on profitability, and thus,
solvency. While one could debate the impetus for the changes in the other financial metrics,
restructuring and reorganization expenses seem more straightforward. This unfortunate
consequence of activism definitively hurts suppliers. Ultimately, our results point towards
strictly negative outcomes for the suppliers of targets. While this, obviously, will not happen in
every case, it underscores the need for caution when an activist first interacts with a target
company.

7. Conclusion
As one can clearly delineate from the literature review, this is an extremely popular topic
in the academic community. Even more, news outlets constantly speak about the new, different
raiders that have taken over in the investing community. However, research indicates that
activists largely contribute in a positive way to the economy, enhancing value creation and the
long-term potential of target companies. Regardless of these positive assertions, it remains
important to discover all consequences of activism. After performing this analysis, it has become
apparent that the presence of an activist has damaging consequences for the suppliers of target
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firms. The most alarming consequence for suppliers is the impact on profitability. As seen,
operating income decreases as suppliers scramble to keep up with contract changes. Observing
the underlying expense ratios specifically exposed the levers that suppliers must pull as they
struggle to remain profitable. Unfortunately, depreciation and amortization costs increase, and
so, too, do other operating expenses. The significant impact on restructuring and reorganization
charges also has a stark impact on suppliers. From a policy perspective, the combination of these
negative shocks implores politicians to pursue potential legal defenses against activism. While
the larger academic literature negates strong policy against activism, it is important that
legislature looks at the larger ramifications. Of course, the capitalist nature of our society
prevents an extreme “visible” hand intervention. However, policy makers must find some way to
benefit the suppliers so that the larger economy can also see gains from these interventions.
Ultimately, if value is created by supplier firms as they recalibrate their business strategy post
activism, then there is not much policy can or should do. In addition, further research is required
to delineate all the spillover effects of activism.

24

8. Appendix

25

26

27

28

Bibliography
A Brav et al., “How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation?” Journal of
Financial Economics (2018).
Aslan, Hadiye and Kumar, Praveen. “The Product Market Effects of Hedge Fund Activism.”
Journal of Financial Economics 119, no. 1 (Jan. 2016): 226-248.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim. “Recent Advances in Research on Hedge Fund
Activism: Value Creation and Identification.” Annual Review of Financial Economics 7,
no. 1 (Dec. 2015): 579 - 595.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim. “The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism:
Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes.” The Review of Financial Studies
28, no. 10 (Oct. 2015): 2723-2769.
Boyson, Nicole M. and Gantchev, Nickolay and Shivdasani, Anil, Activism Mergers (October
31, 2017). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming.
Denes, Matthew, et al. “Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical
Research.” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 44, June 2017, pp. 405–424.
Ellias, Jared A. "Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?
Evidence from Junior Activist Investing." Journal of Legal Analysis 8, no. 2 (Dec. 2016):
493-547.
Gantchev, Nickolay, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision
Model (August 12, 2012). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming.
Gillan, Stuart and Starks, Laura. “The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States.”
Journal of applied corporate finance. 19, no. 1 (n.d.): 55-73.
Goranova, Maria, and Lori Verstegen Ryan. “Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary

29

Review.” Journal of Management 40, no. 5 (July 2014): 1230–68.
Hlavac, Marek (2018). stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics
Tables. R package version 5.2.2. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=stargazer
Jagannathan, Ravi, Alexey Malakhov and Dmitry Novikov. “Do Hot Hands Exist among Hedge
Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation.” The Journal of Finance 65, no. 1 (Jan. 2010):
217-255.
Jiang, Wei, Kai Li, and Wei Wang. “Hedge Funds and Chapter 11”. The Journal of Finance 67,
no. 2 (April 2012): 513-560.
Klein, April, and Emanuel Zur. "Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other
Private Investors." The Journal of Finance 64, no. 1 (2009): 187-229.
Schor, Michael, and Robin Greenwood. “Investor Activism and Takeovers.” Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 92, no. 3, June 2009, pp. 362–375.
Sunder, Jayanthi, Shyam V. Sunder, and Wan Wongsunwai. "Debtholder Responses to
Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions." The Review of
Financial Studies 27, no. 11 (2014): 3318-342.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Bulletin, No. 14 (Jul. 13, 2001) (available at
https://www.sec.gov/pdf/cfslb14.pdf )
Wong, Yu Ting Forester. "Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activism." Order
No. 10108429, Columbia University, 2016.

30

